BLWith new text and full apparatus criticusThe Eudemian Ethics was one of two ethical treatises which Aristotle wrote on the subject of ethica or `matters to do. Donor challenge: Your generous donation will be matched 2-to-1 right now. Your $5 becomes $15! Dear Internet Archive Supporter,. I ask only. Note: Ethica eudemia and de virtutibus et vitiis are translated by J. Solomon. Physical Description: xxiii, p. ; 23 cm. Locate a Print Version: Find in a library .
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The instances noted below are not meant to be complete but rather to be indicative. No keywords specified fix it. Russell, David Robinson, and Christopher Rowe.
This association seems bizarre because Aristotle has just argued that wronging is always voluntary. Such at any rate is the hope.
In the other cases a balancing out by justice does not arise. There is nevertheless a certain going up and down involved. Instead, they expressly deny that these non-necessary things are thus preferable.
Science Logic and Mathematics. No categories specified categorize this paper. This result is confirmed by two related passages in the same overall context. Beyond that point, or where even the political life must ultimately be directed to what is beyond it the contemplation of the godthey take on a different complexion. But why focus on what the wrongdoer knows rather than on what the wronged wants?
Eudemian Ethics – Wikipedia
It is named for Eudemus of Rhodesa pupil of Aristotle who may also have had a hand ethkca editing the final work. But why the shift from constitutions to virtue in EE and not in EN?
EE is, as it were, going off at something of a philosophical tangent.
But we may assume that this possibility is meant to be included: That is why it is a human thing. The Eudemian Ethics is less well-known than Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethicsand when scholars refer simply eudeemia the Ethics of Aristotle, the latter is generally intended.
So one can be voluntarily harmed etc. The EE version would seem thus to be downplaying the person having and stressing the person distributing. The sense must be analogous, that these things are in themselves and by nature among things preferable but not among things preferable in themselves.
It also resolves all the questions in the EE list, at least to the same extent, namely of showing that being wronged is always involuntary. But neither in EE nor in EN is the political or legal just said to be contrary to nature. Individual passages will still have to be examined, of course, because scribal error cannot be excluded in advance.
Aristotle – Ethica Eudemia [Hardback]
But we do not have to suppose error here, for this passage, like the previous two, display the same feature, namely a de- emphasizing of the political and legislative interest. So is the equitable man not a case of someone who wrongs himself? First, however, must come discussion of a passage that gives good grounds to think that the EE mss.
In particular, readings from Kb should not be introduced into EN texts of the common books unless strictly required to make grammatical sense. But if so which of these is in error, for both can make sense? EN moves from saying honor and the like are preferable in themselves, to saying they are not naturally preferable but in between, to saying they are noble and good.
Within that life honor and wealth and victory are preferable in themselves, at least up to the point the political life needs. EN, we may say, sticks to the legislative focus while EE goes beyond it. The answer given is that being wronged is always involuntary, which is the first option, or the first part of the first option, in both lists.
Now EN in its last book returns to the question of regimes and ends with a discussion of legislation and becoming a legislator that leads into the Politics. Further, because of the character of some EN mss. The answer, if there is one, would seem to be precisely that the EE version is not considering the voluntariness or involuntariness of being wronged by itself, but rather the relation of its voluntariness or involuntariness to the voluntariness or involuntariness of wronging.
Certainly this answer resolves all the questions in the EN list, for that list is about whether being wronged is voluntary or involuntary and whether as always one of them or as sometimes one and sometimes the other. There is strictly no conflict between saying first that something is preferable in itself, second that it is not preferable naturally, and third that it is noble.
A third article, published in ,5 is about a ms. Note then a further passage in the same context, at b2, which in both EN and EE wudemia reads: If the EE version says more, as it seems to, the reason must be eudejia the EE version is aiming to satisfy a purely philosophical interest and not to answer something required by the strict needs of the question.
Is all being wronged involuntary, as all wronging is voluntary? Log In Sign Up.