W. B. Gallie; IX.—Essentially Contested Concepts, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 56, Issue 1, 1 June , Pages – Conceptual confusion has long been a source of difficulty in the study of politics. W. B. Gallie’s analysis of ‘essentially contested concepts’, published in ‘W.B. Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts’. Re-Reading of W.B. Gallie, ‘ Essentially Contested Concepts’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian.

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Andrew Mason – – Inquiry: Gallie and Essentially Contested Concepts. The Ethics and Tactics of Argument. Concepts and Action”, pp.

Essentially contested concept

An Interdisciplinary Journal of PhilosophyVol. Rape as an Essentially Contested Concept.

This source might be “within the concept itself”, or “[within] some underlying non-conceptual disagreement between the contestants”. In a paper delivered to the Aristotelian Society on 12 March[1] Walter Bryce Gallie — introduced the term essentially contested concept to facilitate an understanding of the different applications or interpretations of the sorts of abstract, essentialltand evaluative notions [2] —such as ” art ” and ” social justice “—used in the domains of aestheticspolitical philosophyphilosophy of historyand philosophy of religion.

History of Western Philosophy. As a consequence, according to Dworkin, whenever an appeal is made to “fairness”, a moral issue is raised; and, whenever a conception of “fairness” is laid down, an attempt is being made to answer that moral issue.


Art as an Essentially Contested Concept. Yet is also clear that “if the notion of logical justification can be applied only to such theses and arguments as can be presumed capable of gaining in the long run universal agreement, the disputes to which the uses of any essentially contested concept give rise gallle not genuine or rational disputes at all” [ clarification needed ] Gallie, a, p.

Keywords – essentially contested concepts (Gallie)

Susanne Gibson – – Bioethics 18 3: Retrieved from ” https: And, although the notion could be misleadingly and evasively used to justify “agreeing to disagree”, [7] the term offers something more valuable:. Chasing Butterflies Without a Net: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 33 1: Clarke argued that to state that a concept is merely “contested” is to “attribute significance to the contestwd rather than to the concept”. Exploring what he essentjally to be the “crucial distinction” between the overall concept of “fairness” and some particular, and specific conception of “fairness”, he asks us to imagine a group whose members share the view that certain acts are unfair.

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

It has been treated as a challenge in that theorists consider their uses of terms and concepts to be in competition with the uses advocated by other theorists, each theorist trying to be deemed the champion. Some Reflections on the Semantic Web. Sign in to use this feature.


Although Gallie’s term is widely used to denote imprecise use of technical terminologyit has a far more specific application. Wikipedia articles needing clarification from May A Nonevaluative ApproachRodopi, Amsterdam Aprilpp. Debates and applications”Journal of Political Ideologies Vol. Merrill – – Metaphilosophy 23 4: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 56 1: The term essentially contested concepts gives a name to a problematic situation that many people recognize: Social and Political Philosophy categorize this paper.

The four-paragraph passage is in Section II of the article [1]. But once [we] let the truth out of clntested bag — i. By using this site, you agree to the Terms of Use and Privacy Policy.

Essentially Contested or Just Confused? John Kekes – – Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 2: It is important esentially recognize that rather than it just being a case of delivering two different instructions; it is a case of delivering two different kinds of instruction:.