Becker, Gary S. and Stigler, George J. () “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” Journal of Legal Studies: Vol. 3: No. 1, Article . Loading data.. Open Bottom Panel. Go to previous Content Download this Content Share this Content Add This Content to Favorites Go to next Content. ← →. Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers,” The Journal of Legal Studies 3, no. 1 (Jan., ): 1
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Becker University of ChicagoCasey B. The new approach asks why certain industries and not others become regulated or have tariffs imposed on imports or why income transfers take the form and direction they do, in contrast to asking which industries should be regulated or have tariffs imposed, or what transfers should be made.
Mulligan University of Chicago.
Klaus Peter Kaas 6 Estimated H-index: THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics. Transparency in oil rich economies. If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we rnforcement you to do it here.
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Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
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